Norway and the BRICS (IV): Challenges and Opportunities by de Carvalho, Benjamin et al.
1Policy Brief
Norway and the BRICS (IV): 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John Todd
Norway’s relationship to the BRICS countries is a multifac-
eted one – reflecting the diversity of the BRICS cooperation, 
one could add. Yet, as we have argued elsewhere (see de 
Carvalho and Leira 2015; de Carvalho et al. 2015), in spite 
of these differences it is possible do discern some common 
challenge and opportunities for cooperation between Nor-
way and the BRICS countries. 
Here, we identify key challenges and opportunities for Norway 
in how it relates to the BRICS countries.  Rather than take a 
country-by-country approach, the report highlights three key 
challenges and three key opportunities for Norway as it seeks 
to strengthen ties with the BRICS.  This brings both overarching 
and state-specific issues within the scope of the brief.  The chal-
lenges are opportunities are introduced in the diagram below:
 
Figure 1: Norway and the BRICS – Challenges and opportunities
Challenge I: Adjusting to changing international order
This challenge is clearly not unique to Norway, nor caused 
solely by the BRICS countries. Nevertheless, the BRICS Devel-
opment Bank and Contingent Reserve Agreement1 are new 
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1 The Contingent Reserve Agreement creates a fund worth $100bn “to fore-
stall short-term balance of payments pressures, provide mutual support 
and further strengthen financial stability” (Brazilian Ministry of External 
Relations 2014).
Summary
In spite of the differences between the BRICS it is 
possible do discern some common challenges and 
opportunities for cooperation with Norway. 
In security terms, Russian interventionism requires 
a different strategy to increasing Chinese assertive-
ness or the multilateral preferences of Brazil, South 
Africa and India.  
With respect to trade, there are opportunities with 
all five of the BRICS – even in the case of India, the 
world’s largest democracy In reputational terms, nav-
igating a series of relationships with emerging and 
sometimes prickly powers in undoubtedly challeng-
ing, and is likely to remain so. 
In sum, the bilateral relations Norway has with the 
BRICS countries is relatively independent of the form 
or future of the BRICS collaboration. Yet, the BRICS 
play an important part in international governance. 
Should the BRICS collaboration lose momentum in 
the future, Norway may well be in a position to influ-
ence the future of rising power collaboration. 
Keeping this in mind, it is important for Norway to 
focus not only on the challenging security situation 
with Russia and the cold relationship with China, but 
also continuing to strengthen ties and cooperation
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institutional arrangements that reflect the changing interna-
tional order.  Whilst the development bank’s capitalisation is 
some way short of the World Bank—leading some to downplay 
its immediate impact (see for example Tierney 2014:455)—the 
bank will nonetheless provide an significant alternate source 
of credit for developing countries.  Singh (2013:394) mean-
while highlights that “BRICS economies today account for $4.8 
trillion of foreign exchange (FX) reserves, or nearly 40 per cent 
of the world total official FX holdings.” Whilst the changing 
order is most tangible when seen in economic terms, the liberal 
hegemony is also eroding in terms of power and norms.
Norway is in a stronger position to respond to these changes 
than many other European states.  The Government Pension 
Fund gives Norway significant investment clout that could be 
targeted to a greater degree towards developing and emerging 
markets.  This might entail higher risks and lower returns over 
the short term, but would help build Norway’s relationships 
with a broad range of states.  Norway should build its political 
capital through demonstrating the mutually beneficial nature 
of a socially informed investment strategy.  Encouraging the 
BRICS to play a full part in multilateral institutions rather 
than for them to challenge them is also worth doing (see 
below for more on this regarding the High North). 
Challenge II: Russian realpolitik 
Russia’s challenge to Western values and the liberal order has 
been crystallised by events in Ukraine.  The annexation of the 
Crimea and ongoing intervention in the Donbas are illustra-
tive of the diverse applications of military and paramilitary 
force that are an increasingly integral part of Russian political 
thinking.  Russian and Western views continue to diverge: 
this creates policy imperatives for Norway, NATO and the EU. 
However, it is important to temper these concerns by recall-
ing that Europe is and will remain the key customer for Rus-
sian oil and gas over the short and medium term.  This gives 
Europe somewhat greater leverage than has perhaps been 
widely recognised, not to men mention highlighting Norway’s 
position as a friendly and reliable supplier of oil and gas.  Rus-
sia’s ongoing economic woes are also an important factor.
The Norwegian Defence Minister has described Norway’s 
strategy for Russia as based on the principles of firmness and 
predictability.  This approach appears sensible and balanced. 
Pragmatic cooperation between Norway and Russia should 
continue where appropriate, particularly in relation to the 
High North.  Nonetheless, the diplomatic, defence and intel-
ligence communities must work closely together with policy 
makers in order to provide both the predictability and firm-
ness required.  Counter intelligence and cyber defence will be 
critical here in protecting Norway’s infrastructure, intellectual 
capital and national security.  Norway’s support for NATO as a 
political and security alliance is clear and should continue, as 
should Nordic security cooperation.  Support for relevant EU 
initiatives, particularly in relation to rule of law and tackling 
corruption, could potentially be increased.  Supporting efforts 
for greater NATO-EU cooperation would also be advisable.
Challenge III: The relationship with China
There are clear bilateral economic gains to be made from 
improving relationships with China, and good relations are 
a useful diplomatic end in themselves.  The recently finalised 
free trade agreements that China has signed with Iceland 
and Switzerland are of course examples of what might be 
possible should Chinese anger abate.  However, there is a 
risk that Norway seeking to normalise relations in a hasty 
manner would damage its prestige as a proponent of human 
rights and democracy.  The Foreign Minister’s statement that 
the recovery process will take time is positive: precipitative 
action on Norway’s behalf would be strategically inadvisable. 
China’s increasing self-confidence makes this challenge par-
ticularly tricky.  The recent confirmation by Xi Jinping that 
critical journalists would be have their access to the country 
denied is an example of this bullishness (see for example 
Somaiya 2014).   The Norwegian government should consider 
how much political capital and resources to invest in repair-
ing the relationship given that, in the short term at least, it 
appears that the returns on such an investment might well 
be limited.  A strategy of making the most of opportunities 
for cooperation and trade with China whilst building strong 
links with other South East Asian emerging markets might 
be a reasonable compromise over the short to medium term.
Opportunity I: Increase cooperation on environment 
and climate change cooperation
Norway’s climate commitments are significant and challeng-
ing, particularly the pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 
2050.  Such action on climate change and the environment 
carries reputational benefits for Norway as well as help-
ing mitigate the impact of a changing climate.  The recent 
agreement between the US and China is, it is to be hoped, an 
indication that tackling climate change is to receive greater 
priority over the coming period.  China’s commitment to cap 
its CO2 emissions by 2030 is particularly welcome.  In order 
to achieve this, China is investing heavily in hydro, nuclear, 
wind and solar power.  There may therefore be scope for some 
increased cooperation on hydropower (particularly manag-
ing environmental impacts) and, over the medium to long 
term, thorium technology.2  
In terms of Norway’s commitment to climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation, joint working with Brazil (particularly on 
preventing deforestation) and South Africa should continue. 
From a Brazilian perspective, with Petrobras and Statoil oper-
ating large numbers of offshore wells, converting a shared 
interest in the environmental impacts of offshore drilling into 
tangible benefits is also essential.  Support for solar power in 
South Africa could be augmented with joint research on tidal 
and ocean current power generation.  India’s focus on solar 
power also provides an opportunity for collaboration. 
  
2 At present, although both Norway and China are researching the use of 
thorium in power production, they are using different approaches.  Coop-
eration is therefore likely to be limited over the short term.
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Opportunity II: Build significantly stronger political, 
economic and cultural links with India
The Norwegian government has recognised that there is a 
low baseline of cooperation with India at present, though 
the recent state visit by President Mukherjee and the ongoing 
EFTA free trade agreement negotiations are positive indica-
tors.  Building knowledge and understanding of India’s out-
look should be a priority: Prime Minister Modi’s decision to 
play hardball over the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement 
demonstrates Indian preparedness for brinkmanship in mat-
ters of trade in particular (Schaffer 2014).  Stronger political 
links and cultural exchanges would be beneficial in increas-
ing this knowledge and understanding.  
In trade terms, it makes sense for both countries to move 
away from a focus on business process outsourcing activity 
towards collaborative research and infrastructure invest-
ment.  The Modi government’s prioritisation of FDI through 
the ‘Make in India’ campaign should provide opportuni-
ties for Norwegian businesses and investors.  Collaborative 
research efforts should focus on bio-technology, renewable 
energy, defence and health care.  In addition to finalising the 
free trade agreement, Norway and India should also work to 
resolve outstanding issues with visas. 
  
Opportunity III: Continue to emphasise a multilateral 
approach to the High North
The High North has been identified as Norway’s “most impor-
tant foreign policy area” (MFA 2014), and the Arctic Council 
is the key multilateral venue through which Norway pursues 
its strategic interests with regard to the High North.  These 
interests encompass security (through maintaining stability 
in the High North), trade (through developing the High North 
in a sustainable manner) and reputation (through commit-
ment to a cooperative approach).  With Russia a full member, 
and China and India holding observer status, the Artic Coun-
cil is important in demonstrating the benefits of cooperation 
and a multilateral approach. Maintaining and increasing 
support for UNCLOS and the new Polar Code3 will be impor-
tant, both for Norway’s maritime interests and in helping to 
underpin the international legal order.  Continued support 
from Norway can therefore provide a modest contribution 
to the first challenge above, whilst also providing a venue 
for environmental cooperation with Russia in particular.  In 
this vein, sound management of fish stocks through the Joint 
Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission should continue.
In security terms, positive engagement through the Arctic 
Council can help prevent tensions from escalating in the 
High North (whilst recognising that NATO’s role in the region 
will also continue to be important for Norway).  International 
research cooperation will also help build relationships and 
contribute to sustainable development of the High North. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should consider encouraging 
projects involving joint work with Russian, Chinese and 
Indian researchers under the new Artic 2030 programme.
Norway’s goal of increasing the engagement of observer 
states is sound, and the establishment of Arctic Frontiers 
Plus as an informal site for dialogue is useful in this regard 
(see Utenriksdepartementet 2014:18).  That being said, it 
appears there is potential to do more here: the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs should take stock following the 2015 Arctic 
Frontiers Conference to consider what more can be done to 
encourage observer state involvement in the Arctic Council.
Conclusion
We have outlined both common and specific challenges 
and opportunities relevant to Norway’s relationship with 
the BRICS countries.  This in itself demonstrates that that, 
whilst there are some overarching themes, the hetero-
geneous nature of the BRICS rules out a one-size-fits-all 
approach.  In security terms, Russian interventionism 
requires a different strategy to increasing Chinese assert-
iveness or the multilateral preferences of Brazil, South 
Africa and India.  With respect to trade, there are opportu-
nities with all five of the BRICS, but India’s huge potential 
mean that this report has highlighted building relations 
with the world’s largest democracy as a major opportunity. 
In reputational terms, navigating a series of relationships 
with emerging and sometimes prickly powers in undoubt-
edly challenging and as a medium power Norway must 
focus its resources and political capital on key strategic 
priorities like the High North whilst remaining alert to 
emerging opportunities for collaboration.
As was highlighted in the first brief in this series (see 
de Carvalho and Leira 2015), whether to address the 
BRICS countries as a group or not may depend largely 
on the extent to which BRICS countries will seek to push 
the cooperation towards a more institutionalized form, 
which may include a secretariat as hinted at by Russia 
in 2014, but which will nevertheless push the BRICS to 
emphasized commonalities rather than points of conten-
tion both within the group and with states outside of the 
group. Given the important role played by Russia in the 
past in seeking to formalize the contentions rising powers 
have with the current “democratic deficit” in international 
society through more binding cooperation, one could see 
the BRICS running into difficulties in their collaboration 
given Russia’s current posturing and subsequent fall in 
international standing. A possible consequence of this 
is the strengthening of other “rising power clubs” which 
have operated on the sidelines of the BRICS collabora-
tion. Preceding the BRIC cooperation, Russia India and 
China have forged close ties within the RIC framework. 
These high level ministerial summits have reached their 
thirteenth round, as the tripartite group met in Beijing in 
February 2015. They issued a joint statement in which 
they underlined the need for “democratization of inter-
national relations and multi-polarity” as well as opposing 
3 The International maritime Organization has recently introduced the Polar 
Code, a new mandatory code of safety for ships operating in polar waters. 
It will take effect from 2017 (IMO 2014).  
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“forced regime change in any country from the outside, or 
imposition of unilateral sanctions based on domestic laws.” 
The three parties to the BRICS collaboration with higher 
domestic democratic credentials have been meeting within 
the framework of IBSA. India, Brazil and South Africa are 
due to have their seventh summit in New Dehli in 2015, and 
although IBSA has traditionally been more focused on pro-
moting South-South cooperation, should the BRICS arrange-
ments lose pace, it could well become a more central arena 
for rising power cooperation. Being part of all three groups, 
India is likely to be in a pivoting situation, and the direction 
it decides to embark upon may very well prove decisive.
As we have shown through this series of briefs, Norway’s 
relationship to the BRICS is a multifaceted one, just as the 
BRICS are a diverse group of states in spite of their common 
aspirations as emerging (great) powers. As such, the bilateral 
relations Norway has with the BRICS countries is relatively 
independent of the form or future of the BRICS collabora-
tion. Yet, the BRICS play an important part in international 
governance, as they carry a certain amount of moral author-
ity through their ability to speak for the South and the more 
disenfranchised segments of international society. It is there-
fore important for Norway to engage with the BRICS on those 
issues. Should the BRICS collaboration lose momentum in 
the future, Norway may well be in a position to influence the 
future of rising power collaboration. Keeping this in mind, it 
is important for Norway to focus not only on the challenging 
security situation with Russia and the cold relationship with 
China, but also continuing to strengthen ties and coopera-
tion with the democracies of the group: Brazil, South Africa 
and last but certainly not least India. 
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